Course on Set Theory, and based on Kunen Set Theory. It was hold by Dr. Hazel Brickhill at the University of Constance during my 2nd Semester.

1st Lecture: Intro

  • 1878 the Continuum Hypothesis has been stated by G. Cantor
  • 1900 ca. D. Hilbert points for the century, ZFC has been formulated and K. Gรถdel] proved his Incompleateness Theorems
  • 1940 K. Gรถdel proved
  • 1963 P. Cohen proved

We will focus more on the proof by Cohen, since it uses the method called Forcing which will be of our interest during the course. First, letโ€™s examine a couple of ways which would seem to work but because of Gรถdel Second Incompleateness Theorem, namely that for a given theory :

  • but in order to do that you need which goes against the Second Incompleateness Theorem.

  • Alternatively: , then you get which does against the Second Incompleateness Theorem.

On the other hand, we might: which seems to be doable for both proofs.

Remember that is satisfiableโ€, which means that ZFC must have a model. Finding a model of ZFC, as far as I know, should consisting in defining a language , which consists of the usual first order logic + the symbol which denotes the usual . The prof. then mentioned two methods which we might follow, though I didnโ€™t actually get it.

2nd Lecture

The reason why weโ€™re interested in this process is because we want to show that , but this notion of satisfaction is not one we have defined within . This can be done (and is important for some results) but takes some care. Instead we take a different approach here by relativizing formulae.

Relativization is a process that takes formulae from a given language and restricts the domain of their quantifiers to a set . In order to define this process we started to analyse which formulae remain exactly the same and which changes. The following is the definition byย  recursion of Relativisation:

since the other connectives can be defined through these, thereโ€™s no need to write them all. With the quantifiers things changes:

For every formula in there exists an . Though, not always if a formula holds in a theory its relativization to a certain set must hold as well. For example we saw that the Axiom of Extentionality: on the set doesnโ€™t hold. It holds iff. the set is transitive, def. is transitive iff. ; to see more, look at Relativising Axioms.

Remember that what we want to show when relativising is that for and it holds that:Comulative Hierarchy: we denote, as in Wikipedia, with for an ordinal the set defined by recursion as: (K. writes it as )

  • ย 

  • for an ordinal :

  • for any limit ordinal :

Similarly, one can define it as:

Remember that an ordinals are the sets generated by the usual operations of , successor, addition, multiplicationโ€ฆ A limit ordinal is an ordinal that is not 0 nor a successo ordinal, e.g. remember that has no predecessor, on the other hand, obviously has a predecessor.

The image we get is the usual since for any ordinal we have .

Definition: we say that is grounded if there is an ordinal s.t. (). If is grounded, let be the least s.t. . (Ax. of Foundation assumes that all sets are grounded.)

Note: if then

Axiom of Foundation: there are three equivalent statements:

  • every non empty set has a member s.t.

  • there is no function s.t.

  • all sets are grounded

Absoluteness Defined

Definition: we say a formula is absolute for if and Where denotes the set of free variables of and is inductively defined as follows:

  • ย 

is a function defined by recursion on the complexity of -formulae.

These examples of formulae that are absolute for any transitive set :

Notice that all of those have no quantifier, then clearly there cannot be any difference in their relativisation and are therefore absolute.

How to Compute

In order to prove that a formula is absolute there is a simple procedure to follow:

Rewrite s.t. every subformula is either a formula in or another absolute formula for transite sets. Remember that ย  andย  , therefore any other sentence made by logical connectives and absolute formulas will be absolute too. Concrete examples can be found in Relativising Axioms.

Non-Absolute Formulae in Transitive Sets

These formulae require the set to be not transitive in order to be equivalent in both their forms, namely and . You can find complete proofs in the uploaded PDF โ€œRelativizing and absolutenessโ€.

Letโ€™s start with an example:

  1. ย 

Normally it holds that , since , ,ย 

Consider since the only difference lays in the fact that and it isnโ€™t in 3; but since , since it doesnโ€™t corresponds to any number then . To conclude: .

2)ย 

Letโ€™s try to prove it absolute for transitive sets: the first step is writing it in , so: , at first sight, one might think it as being absolute since , , are all absolute. But remember, in order to say that a formula is absoltute, we need , though this is not secured by the assumptions; even if both and were in (which, I suppose, is not secured either) then it must not hold that . Similarly consider , it might be (or not) that , then depending on , it might be that .

Relativising Axioms

When we try to relativise an axiom to a set we claim: Some examples:ย 

The Axiom of Extentionality is defined as: , I start by the claim:

Now consider then Ax. Ext., since if we pick , , since they donโ€™t contain any of the elements in they satisfy the antecedent and should then be equal.

Lemma: is transitive then Ax. Ext.

Proof.: Let be transitive and with . Then there some set with

. Without loss of generality assume and . Then

by transitivity.

Axiom of Separation

Lemma: (K. 2.6) If then Ax. of Sep..

Proved in K. ย 

The Axiom of Emptyset is defined as: , letโ€™s start with the first step for proving it absolute, rewrite it in , so: . Now letโ€™s relativise it to and derive the conclusions: (see K. 115). Letโ€™s find some for which the the Ax. Emp. doesnโ€™t hold: let then Ax. Emp. even though .

Prop.: if is not empty then Ax. Empt.

Proof.: By Ax. Foundation there is with .

The Axiom of Foundation is defined as: I relativise it: , using the absoluteness of and proved above. Let , then by Ax. Foundation but then by transitivity of : .

Finally we get:

Lemma: if is transitive and non-empty then satisfies the Axioms of Exstentionality, Emptyset and Foundation.

The Proof of

Lemma: For a limit ordinal , satisfies the axioms of pairing, union, powerset and the axiom scheme of separation. If additionally then also satisfies the Axiom of Infinity

Some needed definitions first: an ordinal is a limit ordinal if there is an ordinal less than , and whenever is an ordinal less than , then there exists an ordinal such that . For example, is the smallest ordinal greater than every natural number. All ordinals you build starting from are countable, though, even if their cardinality is the same, they can differ. We denote with the first uncountable ordinal and the sequence: is (strictly) increasing in cardinality. And then is defined as the set containing all ordinals smaller than . Letโ€™s start with the first three axioms:

The Axiom of Paring relativised to : since, as we saw, is absolute for every set, we can just rewrite it, so: , left to show is just that which holds since: . These rules come from the definition of .

The Axiom of Union relativised to : which is equivalent toย  , since is absolute on any set, then left to show is only that , which holds since so .

The Axiom of Powerset relativised to : which is equivalent to since is absolute for any set. And since so .

The Axiom of Infinity relativised to : and since both and are absolute formulae for all sets, then it is equivalent to: . Then , , so in particular that holds for any in .

3rd Lecture

Definition: (ext.) where means that there is a -path from to .

Note: is the smallest transitive s.t. . Also holds.

Definition: a cardinal is inacc. iff it isnโ€™t a result of cardinal arithmetic from smaller cardinals.

Definition: , min size needed to be unbounded

Definition: a cardinal is regular iff else itโ€™s singular.

Example: (ext.) Consider , that is the first cardinal number which is larger than for every finite n. We have that is a cofinal sequence, as every ordinal below is smaller than some , but this is merely a countable set while is very much uncountable, so hence is singular.

For computing we should consider the following simple rules (ext.):

  • , hence all cardinals , for a successor ordinal, are regular

  • for a limit ordinal, e.g. ย 

Definition: (K. IV.6.1) For any infinite cardinal , , we write for .

Lemma: (K. IV.6.4) For any infinite the following hold:

  • is transitive

  • is regular

Lemma: (K. IV.6.3) For regular, is strongly inacc.

Lemma: (K. IV.6.2) For any infinite ,

Therefore all that we have proved in the last lecture on it must hold for too, hence:

Theorem: For an inaccessible cardinal , .

(Also in K. IV.6.5 reg. ย  )

Now we want this model to be countable, though it is not, since is an inaccessible cardinal.

What we proved the last lecture was that for every limit ordinal and except for Ax. of Replacement.

Lemma: if is inacc. then

Note: this just trivially follows from the definition above of

Lemma: if is regular MISTAKE

The Ax. of Replacementย  is a axiom schema, take a with . We have to show that where denotes that there the class is a function. ==IDK .==

First split the two parts , then start with the first partย  , (just by espanding ) and then, by relativisation: .

We can see that it holds for , which therefore is a function, though we still have to get to . Define: and apply the Ax. of Rep. to and get . Let be arbitrary and . We need to show (i) and (ii) .

  • (i) Clearly . As by Prop and , thus by Prop. 2 .

  • (ii) is , as This is true as it is just expressing .

Alternatively, from Kunen:

Definition: we say , is strongly inacc., iff those are satisfied

  • is inacc.

  • ย 

Theorem: (IV.6.6) for reg. and tfae:

Lemma: (K. IV.6.8) then "" is absolute for .

Some Definitions

Def. let ย  be set or class terms and , with . We say is absolute between and if .

Before we compared a set with only, namely the universe of sets, the notion defined here is a weaker version. Even weaker are the two following terms:

Downward absolute if:

Upward absolute if: ย 

We say that is a substructure of if and the interpretation function of is the restriction of the interpretation function for .ย 

For , , say if

Definition or, in words, is an elementary substructure of for all it holds that , we also say if all are absolute betweeen .

Definition A list of formula is subfor. closed if all subfor. of a for. on the list is on the list.

Lemma (Traski-Vaught Test K. IV.7.3) Let be a subformula closed list, , tfae:

  • are absolute for

  • Whenever of the form , Note: when has some other shape, then it is trivial, since we are in a subformula closed list, the only other case is when has no quantifier, and is therefore trivially absolute on all sets.

Proof. (i) (ii) is clear. Fixย  and assume , i.e . Then by absoluteness of , we getย  so .

(ii) (i) By indiction on leght of , so we assume that (IH) is not absolutely hold for subformulae.

  • atomic - by definition of absolute if its atomic or , theyโ€™re defined as .

  • = by IH are absolute so by def of relativisation is absolute.

  • Similarly for

Now the interesting part:

, fix then \leftrightarrow . All is then equivalent to .

ย  understand proof; should I?

Def. for if , then we say namely if has bounded variables only:

  • ,

  • then ,

  • if then ย 

Lemma let be a transitive set, then any formula is absolute for .

Proof. By ind. on lenght of for., and with the former lemma, we need to show that if is of the form then \forall_{a \in W} \forall_\vec{y} \in W (\exists_x(x \in a \land \psi(x, \vec{y},a))\rightarrow \exists_{x\in W}(x \in a \land \psi (x, \vec{y},a)))_W

So let a, and suppose and is as is and of leght less then so by IH is absolute. for i.e. . Why is there some in ? Further as a in , a so then since these two are already relativesed to , then it implies .

4th Lecture

Recap from ext.

Reflection Theorem from Kunen

We need here to instantiate the Lรถwenheim-Skolem theorem in order to โ€œfind a set s.t. every formula is absolute for . In particular, if is a sentence, then , so if is an axiom of , will be true. Actually, becasue of the problem (Gรถdel) discussed above, if we work within we can only prove the existence of an for which an arbitrarily prescribed finite list of formulae are absolute.โ€ (K. p.135) This restriction though still allows us to find a model for any finite set of axioms and no more than a finite set of axioms is what constitutes any kind of proof. Thanks to the Tarski-Vaught test presented in the previous lecture we can now easily tell whether a set of formulae is absolute for , letโ€™s paste it here too:

Lemma (Traski-Vaught Test (2) K. IV.7.3) Let be a subformula closed list, , tfae:

  • are absolute for

  • Whenever of the form , Note: this method allows us to consider onlu truth of formuale in the larger class, . In our first application, we take and tru to find a set, s.t. are abs. for :

Reflection Theorem: for a(ny) list of formuale Kunen first states a more general version of the theorem and proves that one, we didnโ€™t see that version in class though. The set of formulae here is clearly finite, though โ€œPlatonistically, we could carry out the arguments of 7.3-7.6 with all formulas simultaneously and show that where list all axioms of . But this argument cannot be formalised within [โ€ฆ] given axioms of , the first which is a model of is not a model of , and the proof of Cor. 7.7 explicitly procuces a theorem of , namely , which is false in this .โ€ (K. p.139)

Downward Lรถwenheim-Skolem Theorem from ext.

Theorem: (Down. Lรถ-Sk) for inf. and inf. then exists s.t. , .

Proof. easily divisible in three steps:

  1. For each the implies the existence of a function s.t. for all either or .

  2. From the family of functions we can define on as: for any .

  3. Call the iteration of countably many times. Now for an arbitrary pick one s.t. , define (3.1), one can see that also (3.2), also is an elem. substr. of by the Tarsky-Vaught Test (3.3).

T.-V. test: .

We instantiate the Down. Lรถ-Sk Theorem in the following theorem:

Theorem: (K. IV.7.8) for a structure and a list of formulae then:Though this is not really what we did in class and Iโ€™m not sure about this yet. See the next lecture

Messy Lecture Notes

**Downward Lรถwenheim-Skolem Theorem

Theorem: Let be an infinite -structure, fix a cardinal with and let with . Then there is an s.t. and .

Proof. we prove this for and f-models. Fix M an infinite set and an infinite cardinal.

possiamo usare il teorema per prendere una countable substructure of ZFC o qualcosa di piรน complesso, รจ quello per cui ci serve questo teorema. Ora continuo con la dimostrazione.

and |S| \le k. (Ma noi vogliamo che alla fine S abbia esattamente la dimensione di k. Iniziamo con S perche tutto quello che sta in S allora sta in N, quindi cerchiamo priam di lavorare con S, poi vediamo). If \mathcal{L}\epsilonR\phi = \exists_x \psif\phi :M^{n_\phi} \rightarrow M\vec{y} \in M^{n_\phi}, if . now let by R-least in M s.t. (M, \epsilon) \models \psi(f_\phi(\vec{y}, \vec{y}) if set f_\psi(\vec{y})=0. Now set N_0 = Sโ€™ and define by recursion for some . Set .

Claim .

clearly as .

|N_| \le |N_0| \oplus (| N_o^{n_\phi}| \oper \aleph_0) \le k \oplus k (k che moltiplica k per n_\phi volte) Heisenberg theorem says that these make no difference

quindi alla moltiplicazione alla fine moltiplichiamo anche \aleph_0, la cardinalita di tutto questo, appunto per heisenberg theorem รจ proprio k, non aumenta, resta uguale.

similarly |N_i| = |N_0| = k, thus |N| \le |N_0| \oplus |N_1|. \oplusโ€ฆ

Claim 2 (N, \epsilon) \le (M, \epsilon)

By lemma (that we proved the last lecture) we just need to show that. . BY induction on the leght of formulae we assume that \psi is absolute for M and N, then let and assume . Then there must be some s.t. vec{y} \in N_i^{n_\phi}. Thus . So and by IH . Thus .ย 

check proof

Such is called a Skolem Hull of .

Now consider , is inaccessible, ,ย  .

Def. Let \mathcal{M} be an \mathcal{L} structure X \subseteq M^n is definable in \mathcal{M} iff there is an \mathcal{L}-formula \phi with n free varibales s.t. for a_1, โ€ฆ a_n \in M. \mathcal{M} \models \phi(a_1, โ€ฆ, a_n) \Leftrightarrow (a_1, โ€ฆ, a_n) \in X. So consider the case in which X \subseteq and X is a sigleton {a}. e.g. {\emptyset} is definable in V_\lambda.

Aby hereditarily finite set is definable in V_k, \omega can be defined, but also \omega +1, \omega + \omega, \omega^\omega and also \omega_1= \alpeh_1 but also \omega_2 and also \aleph_\omega, these can all be defined. We have very much countable ordinals and some uncountable. Though we cant define all countable ordinal, otherwiseโ€ฆ una formual definisce una sola cosa, abbiamo countable ordinals quindi di quelle prima omega prima di omega 1 ne avremo tanti, a tanti ma non abbastanza per arrivare ad \omega_1 per il fatto che quello รจ uncountable ed al massimo possiamo definire countable many things, e quindi countably many formulas e quindi di tutte quelle omega che ho scritto ne abbiamo definito un ammount finito anche se \omega_1 non รจ countable. Quindi di fatto quello che abbiamo รจ una linea di countable models poi un saltino e dopo abbiamo \omega_1.

La tecnica che abbiamo usato ora grazie al Loewenheim.sk. th. รจ un metodo carino, parti da un set (presumo N) e poi vai avanti. Ma non รจ un metodo perfetto, ce ne serve uno migliore. quel teorema ad esempio non funziona se anziche noi anziche iniziare con N avessimo iniziato con V, cosa non funziona se facciamio cosi? Axiom of choice non dice che possiamo avere un welll ordering on V, cosa che abbiamo imposto per M invece. Un altro problema invece รจ cheโ€ฆ boh non ho ben capito. Ok quindi boh mi ha guardato dicendo eh voi filosofi, e boh on ho capito.

boh check

Montague-Lory Reflection Theorem

Let , then are absolute for

Notice that (i) this is a theorem schema and (ii) I can pick to be all axioms of (not finite!!) then .

Proof. ==Online ext.==

From: Wikipedia:

A naive version: โ€œfor any property of we can find a set with the same propertyโ€, we should be more careful on what properties we allow.

Gรถdel: โ€œThe universe of all sets is structurally indefinable.โ€

Thm: for any formula with parameters, if is true (in the set-theoretic universe ), then there is a level of the cumulative hierarchy such that .

Thm: for any finite number of formulas of we can find a set in the cumulative hierarchy such that all the formulae in the set are absolute for .

==does it have something to do with it? yt Antonio==

==Watch yt conference 1:42==ย 

5th Lecture

Mostowski Collapsing Lemma

Definition: we say that a relation is extensional on iff:Note: the rel. , by Ax. of Ext., is ext. on , in fact this is the Identity criterion for sets. (K. III.5.15)

Theorem: For , a rel. on ext., exists a unique tran. set and an isom. .

Then we notice do the two following passages:

Theorem: (K. IV.7.8) for a structure and a list of formulae then:We first pick a subset of , call it , then we apply the Down Lรถ-Sk Th. to it and get .

Then we apply the Mostowski Collapsing lemma to each to obtain a transitive model, all properties will be preserved, so:

Lemma: (K. IV.7.9) There exists a s.t. .

Hence for each formula we have: .

Corollary: (K. IV.7.10) let a t.m., for any there is an s.t.ย ย 

  • ย 

  • is trans.

Corollary: (K. IV.7.11) let be axioms extending then Thanks to the Down. Lรถ-Sk Theorem we can conclude that โ€œin can we can prove the existence of a ctm for any desired finite fragment of . By listing enough axioms, we can ensure that all the specific absoluteness results of ยง3 and ยง5 hold for , and that and are defined. But these concepts are not absoยญlute. is a countable ordinal which โ€œthinksโ€ is uncountable; but that just means that there is no function in from onto . Likewise, is really countable, but not by someone living in . The fact that sets in can be really countable but uncountable from the point of view of (i.e., โ€œcountableโ€ is not absolute) is known as the Skolem Paradox.โ€ (K. p.141)

Forcing

Preface

We have previously proved that we can produce a model of a finite ampunt of axioms of within . Now we use the method of forcing to produce a model for any finite list of axioms of . Such will be a generic extension of models for suitably many axioms of . Our claim will be , the proof will follow this schema:

  1. For contradiction assume , hence

  2. Then there is a finite list of axioms , s.t.

  3. With Forcing we show , hence we just did it!!

  4. Hence , hence .

Definitions

Definition (K. VII.2.1) A Forcing Poset is a triple , where is a set, is a pre-order on (i.e. transitie and reflexive) and is an element of and is the largest element under the ordering, namely . All elements of are called forcing conditions.

Notation (said as โ€œp extends qโ€), also abuse notation using to refer to .

Note that ensures that the orderig is connected,ย 

Note that if is a partial order is unique

Notation (said as โ€ and are compatibleโ€) if , i.e. they have a common extension.

Note that in a diamond all elements are compatible.

Note that in a tree two elements are compatible iff. they belong to the same branch.

Example Consider as a forcing poset. You have on top, then all (infinite) singletons, then, in the second layer you have all sets with two elements, which are connected to the singletons above by inclusion. A the bottom youโ€™ll then find , the shape is diamond and therefore all elements are compatible since all can be extended to .

Example Let s.t. , consider with . Notice then that , also notice that there is no least element.

Def. (in relata รจ un altro esempio ma lo useremo dopo quindi capiscilo bene)

Definition for sets is the set of all finite partial functions from to .

Example Consider as a forcing poset, where say ( ) and () then Notice also that if and agree on then we have . Also and .

Definition Let be a forcing poset, let , we say is dense in iff .

Example Let be infinite and , then pick then define . Let and define s.t. if then else define , for an . Then for any we found s.t. and (for any ).

Now define , notice that it is not a dense if , since if we have , then () and and .

Notice that if has a minimum, i.e. it is diamond shaped, call it , then is a dense set.

Definition (K. II.2.4) Let be a forcing poset, then is a filter on iff.

  1. ย 

note if then

Example The model theoretic filter on is the set theoretic filter on the forcing poset .

If has a partial order, then ๐Ÿ™.

Example , infinite, , a filter on , then any agree on .

Messy Notes

Also if with and for with . ehm..?

6th Lecture

Definition is an atom of if there are no ย  s.t. .

Example

  1. , all elements are atoms

  2. If the order is linear, then all elements are atoms

  3. A tree that branches at every node is atomless

  4. , , finite has atoms (those that have no trivial extension, namely the functions defined on the whole )

  5. If is infinite and then is atomless, you can always extend any to another function defined on a new s.t. you take two different ways, s.t. .

Definition say is -gen. over iff is a filter on and: Lemma If , c.t.m of , atomless and is -gen. over , then .

Example , infinite, , a filter on , then any agree on . So setting is a function. , is dense in so if then .

Existence Lemma (K. VII.2.3)ย 

Let be a ctm s.t. then ย 

Claim. Let be a count. family of dense subset of , and let . Then there is a filter on s.t. and for any

Proof. let enumerate all dense subsets of which are in . Chose a sequence s.t. ย  and , then notice that is a filer, since all elements are compatible.

Definition (K. VII.2.5) is a -name iff is a relation s.t. is a -name .

Also denotes the class of all -names, defined by recursion as:

  1. for .

  2. for .

Note that the ordering isnโ€™t relevant here.

Definition is a tran. of s.t. , then is a -name .

Definition (K. VII.2.7)for a -name, , by rec. .

Then the generic extension for a ctm s.t. .

Lemma: (K. after VII.2.9): (i) , (ii) else .

Lemma: (Pascal 19.09): for a name we have:

  • ย 

Examples , is a filter then then say:

  • then .

  • , for so:

  1. .

, then we have sinec

then ==

7th Lecture

Recall from the previous lecture the following definition: For a -name and define by rec. on , we set .

Lemma 1. For it holds:

  1. is countable and transitive
  2. is minimal (for any set with the above features we have ),

For proving that, weโ€™ll need some definitions and lemmas:

Definition For a set , define by rec. , clearly is a -name.

Proof of 1.1.

Lemma (K. VII.2.11) Let be a filter on , then:

  1. and
  2. Proof. 1. 2. trivial, and for 1. notice that: by absoluteness ofย  ย  and by induction as . ย 

Proof of 1.2.

Definition Define , so (by 1.1.) , so must name , , is definable within and clearly is a -name.

Proof of 1.4.

As in Kunen:

Definition: (K. VII.2.16)ย 

Lemma: (K. VII.2.17) if :

  1. and

  2. and

Lemma: (K. VII.2.18) Ax. of Ext., Found., Pair., Union are true in .

Proof. Ext. holds because is trans., Found. holds for any set, pairing is trivial from 2.17(1.).

For Union: if , there is a s.t. ; fix s.t. , let , then , so (). If is any element of for some . Since , thus .

I continue the path as in Kunen:

Definition: let and , we say that is dense below iff:

Lemma: (K. VII.2.20) trans., , , , , let be a -gen. over , then

  1. Either or .

  2. If and is dense below , then .

8th Lecture

From Kunen, consider the following example: fix a ctm for , let , where is the empty function. We see that , since its definition is absolute for transitive models (?). If is a filter on , say (we know that since holds in a filter) is a function with , so, for each , let , then is dense and (by abs. of its def. (?)). Thus if is -gen. over , then we have that: , so .

Claim. . We proved that , we also know that Ax. of Union is absolute fro transitive models of , therefore .

We also proved that if is -gen. then (VII.2.4.). , then is dense and , so if then also but by def. of the gen. it canโ€™t be the case.

Letโ€™s introduce forcing, we start with a little story:

the people in canโ€™t construct a that is -gen., they may have faith that there exists a being to whom their universe, , is countable. Such a being would have a generic and an . The people in have no epistemic access to those objects, though they have names for them: and . There are some properties that those people can find out of and , e.g. that , but they don.t know e.g. what is equal to, since that depends on the chosen. They know that and (since they know that and all those functions must agree on where goes). They can evolve even more and construct a language, a forcing language, where a sentence uses names to assert on , e.g. the proposition . The person in may not know whether a given is true in because it will depend on to which they canโ€™t access. We write then to mean that for any which are -gen. over if then . For instance: and . They also write and , these are formulae true for all generics . We deduce then that people in are able to decide some . This is needed to see that , in fact, even after that, people in will build very complicated for which the desired axioms are forced to be true in . By definition of we know that if for some then , though, the converse is true too, in fact:ย 

Equivalence Lemma (L. 10): . For instance, if , then , this holds for any .

Now we prove point (5) from the previous lecture, claim: Let be a transitive model of s.t. and , then .

Proof. The def of is absolute between transitive models of so if and then for . So:

Lemma: For all :

  1. ( denotes the ordinals) Proof. in the Notes

We are left to show that Ax. Sep. i.e. for any formula in , , then there is an s.t. . Considering the following simple example:

Example: take , , ; I need then to fined a name s.t. . Why not just take to be ? Because if then we canโ€™t assume . An alternative is: If is of the form then , this works but in general, for something in , we donโ€™t know if itโ€™s of that form. For instance suppose and . Then iff there is some s.t. and . Thus if there is a , s.t. , and , then so we could put in .

Definition: we say that is the collection of formulae in the language extended with constant symbols for each name .

Example: if is a formula of with as a free variable then is in . So let be a sentence of (namely without free variables), then has the usual model theoretic meaning with interpreted as membership and any constant symbol/-name interpreted as .

Definition: let and , say: iff for all -generic filters over with we have .

Also (K. VII.3.1): let , , let be a ctm for , in , and , so iff Example: let be the name for generic if then , i.e. for all filters s.t. we have , i.e. , i.e. , i.e. . So we say that if extends and is in the generic, then is in the generic too.

It also holds that iff. for all -gen. filters over , e.g. Ax. Union by the lemma of the last week. If is atomless and , then . But and , we may have and . Also .

Lemma: If and then .

Proof. If and for a filter , then by upward closure, so all generics s.t. are a subset of all those s.t. , so if holds in the latter, it must hold in the former too. ย 

Example: Back to the previous example, we have: , is a name but is it definable in (i.e. is )? Clearly not, so we have a problem:

Problem:

  1. We defined using generic for , and these are generally not in , so we have no obvious reson to think .
  2. How can we be sure that . So since if is a generic with , hen iff , hence then . But how do we know, for every there is some s.t. ? In order to solve this we now state two lemmas: the truth lemma and the definability lemma:???

Truth Lemma: Let be a sentence in , a -generic filter over , then: Note: "" is obvious from the definition of .

Example: look at the proof of (5) in the next lecture Definability Lemma: Let be a formula of with , then is definable without parameters in .

Note: You should also check the Tarski Undefinability Lemma, which states that truth in a model canโ€™t be defined within itself.

With these lemmas weโ€™ll see that works as it should.

Definability Lemma for and the Truth Lemma implies that i.e. , thus .

In the next lecture weโ€™ll finish the proof of (4).

9th Lecture

Recall that for some . So iff , so the DL says that is definable, so

Lemma: for any and sentence it holds:

  1. No forces boht and

  2. If are logically equivalent then iff

  3. and then

  4. iff

Proof. all clear from def.

Lemma: Ax. Sep.

Proof. Fix a formula of with โ€ฆ , forget the proof

Theorem

Proof. There are just Power set and Replacement missing, those are proven in the notes.

You also find the Axiom of Choice proven in this book.

forget those proofs.

Lemma: I continue the previous list with other properties of forcing:

  1. iff iff

  2. iff

  3. iff. is dense below

Proof.

(5) "" clear from .

"" Assume , then we can find sucha a generic with and . By TL here is s.t. ; since is a filter we can find s.t. then , hence, by (3), contradiction. ((very easy, use this as an example of the TL))

(6) The same as in (5) if you remember that .

(7) (), then it is eq by (6) to: . Definition: (K. VII.2.19) A set is dense below if .

Now observe that if and then there is a s.t. and .

Lemma: let with only as a free variable:

  1. iff forall

  2. iff what on this set?

Proof. (1) iff for all , so if iff for all then all generics be with and ย  iff .

(2) By (5) and (1) for all , ,

10th Lecture

Today we want to prove the TL and the DL, it is of no use for the application of forcing and, in order to do so, we need to define , so:

Definition: (K. VII.3.3) let s.t. , , , then:

  1. iff

  2. for all , is dense below and

  3. for all , is dense below and

  4. iff is dense below

  5. iff and

  6. iff there is no s.t.

  7. iff is dense below

Lemma:

Why this? People in canโ€™t properly use the relation since that has been defined in and not in and therefore involves a knowledge of all possible generics. Instead, we should be able to decide within whether hence we define this second relation s.t. it basically does the same, in fact .

Lemma: let , tfae:

  1. is dense below

3.ย  ย 

(Proof in the Notes)

Lemma: for , if and then

Lemma: let with dense below () if is -generic over and , then .

Equivalence Lemma: (K. VII.3.6) let be ctm of , , let , :

  1. For all :

  2. TL: For all -gen. over , : ย 

Equivalence Lemma: (Lecture Notes)

Lemma: let be a ctm with and be a -generic over . Fix then:

  1. if and then

  2. if then there is some s.t.

Not proved

Corollary: let be as in in the previous lemma, then .

Proof. for an generic (s.t. ), . Now suppose but , by the first lemma of today (3) we have , then for such a , by def of "" we have . Let be a generic with , then so by def of . By lemma the last lemma (2) s.t. since , , , then we get by the first lemma of today (1), then we get contradiction and our claim is proved, .

11th Lecture

Example From Kunen

Brief Recap

Pars

  1. Define

  2. Set , ,

  3. by abs.

  4. is dense

  5. , hence ย 

  6. Then we have

Pars

  1. Define ย 
  2. has
  3. Def. preserves cardinals
  4. Def. preserves cofinalities
  5. cof card
  6. cof
  7. has pres. cof and card

Pars

has , hence , hence , hence .

Definition: , ,

Notice that since โ€œfiniteโ€ is absolute so is the definition of . Hence if then . Then for a filter on , note that .ย 

Now, for , define and note that it is dense for any . Furthermore, by absoluteness, if ; thus if is a gen. over , then then . Hence:

Lemma: is-gen. ov. .

Now take a s.t. and , let and a -gen. over . Then ==(by abs. of )==, and is a func. from onto , so in we see that is a countable ordinal. We say that collapses . So: .

Similarly we can use a different so that will help us to obtain a model of . Take the same but now , for a gen. , then , this can be regarded as a sequence of functions, let for , . By absoluteness , all elements of this sequence are distinct since for :Note that is dense in , since, like for , you can always extend those functions since is infinite, so then . Thus we notice that contains a -sequence of distinct functions from into , then:

Lemma: if and a -gen. over then .

If we now take , then we could say that in hence, . We need first to check that is actually , this is not obvious, we have seen how a slight change in the can cause changes on countable and uncountable cardinals, weโ€™ll prove that this is not the case since has the in . Letโ€™s start with:

Definition: let be a forcing poset and , then is an antichain iff , namely all elements are pairwise incompatible. is a maximal antichain iff is an antichain and there is no s.t. is an antichain, i.e. .

Example: in a tree ordering any level is an antichain and if every node branches then any level is a maximal antichain (watch the notes for a picture).

Example: set , then is an antichain of size so it is maximal, .

Definition: has the countable chain condition () iff all antichains in are countable, also has the iff all antichains in are of size . Hence .

Example: Consider a binary tree ordering, is it ? No! Take the binary tree is an infinite antichain, it is though a since the whole tree is countable. In general notice that has the .

Lemma: let , has the iff is countable. If is infinite, has the .

I can just instantiate this lemma to get:

Lemma: has .

There are many others with . The relevance of the in forcing is that we have the following lemma which gives us a way to approximate within any function in .

Lemma: Assume: , is , , is -gen. over , s.t. . There is a s.t. , , . ??

In order to see the use of this we shall first define:

Definition: let we say that preserves cardinals iff whenever is -gen. over we have:Since is absolute, it is a problem only if . Also if is a cardinal of it also is one in , since any function in from a smaller ordinal onto must be in too why??. Similarly:

Definition: let then preserves cofinalities if is a -gen. over and is a limit ordinal in and .

Lemma: (K. VII.5.8)ย  preserves cofinalities preserves cardinals

To simplify how to check preservation of cofinalities we know

Lemma: (K. VII.5.9) let , if โ€˜whenever is a -gen. over and a regular uncountable cardinal of , then is reg.โ€™, then preserves cofinalities.

Hence we derive

Theorem: if and has , then preserves cofinalities and hence cardinals.

Now we have all tools we need to produce a model of .

Let , hence has in , thus it preserves cardinals, so , then . But can we make ? Clearly holds also in any cardinal preserving extension of .

Other Notes

Lemma: let , tfae:

  1. is dense below

3.ย  ย 

(Proof in the Notes)

Lemma: for , if and then

Lemma: let with dense below () if is -generic over and , then .ย 

Messy Notes

From the Lecture Notes

Here some general notes on the procedure and the use of the previous lemmas in the process of proving independence of :

Let be a ctm and an atomless forcing poset, also a -generic over . Then, by a previous lema, we have: (i) is a ctm, (ii) and (iii) is minimal s.t. (i) and (ii) hold.

We now want to show that , so if . Also recall , is infinte, . if is -generic over then is a function with , ,.

Example: , if is a generic over , then is a characteristic foundation for a new subset of . Let with , meaning that according to there is an element corresponding to even if is countable.

Let then and be a -generic over . Let . Then as above. We can think of as coding -many functions where . Then is dense for : for we extend to $p: =. q \cup {((\alpha, n), 0), ((\beta, n),

1)}n > max({m | \exists_{\gamma \in k} \gamma, mย  \in dom(q)})p \in E_{\alpha, \beta}GE_{\alpha, \beta}h_\alpha \not = h_\beta\alpha \not = \beta$.

4.7, recall the first lemma of the last week: if is a generc over M, , , then there is s.t. and .

Let be a ctm and , let be a -generic over , . Define by , then for , and , but now, how do we know htat ?

For we need to check .

Example: let with as above, then we know for a -generic over , , is surj. Thus is countable. there will be an ordinal s.t. but .

Definition: for a forcing poset :

  1. preserves cardinals iff .

  2. preseres cofinalities iff for all -generic and for all ordinals , .

Notice that the example above does not preserve cardinals nor cofinalities.

Note: In 1. "" always holfas as is a cardinal iff there is no bijection for some , and and. being a bijection is absolute between ctm. In 2.ย  we have for similar reasons, being a cofinite map is absolute for transitive sets.

In 1. this is true for by absoluteness.

A question we may still have is: why are we interested in while ahas nothing to do with it?

Lemma:ย 

  1. pres. iff for all gen. and limit s.t. then * is reg.* is reg..

  2. If preserves then preserves cardinals.

Proof. check it from the Notes

Definition: let be a forcing poset and , then is an antichain iff , namely all elements are pairwise incompatible. is a maximal antichain iff is an antichain and there is no s.t. is an antichain, i.e. .

Example: in a tree ordering any level is an antichain and if every node branches then any level is a maximal antichain (watch the notes for a picture).

Example: set , then is an antichain of size so it is maximal, . clear??

Definition: has the countable chain condition () iff all antichains in are countable, also has the iff all antichains in are of size . Hence .

Example: Consider a binary tree ordering, is it ? No! Take the binary tree is an infinite antichain, it is though a since the whole tree is countable. uhm...? sus In general notice that has the . what is that +?

Lemma: let , has the iff is countable. If is infinite, has the .

Proof on the Notes, it is a huge proof, so I should check it once at least.

Theorem: If and is ccc, then preserves cofinalities and hence cardinals.

12th Lecture

I list here 5 numbered lemmas and a theorem, some of them have been proved already here.

Lemma 1. if is -generic over and , , then .

Lemma 2.ย 

  1. pres. iff for all gen. and limit s.t. then * is reg.* is reg..

  2. If preserves then preserves cardinals.

Lemma 3. let , is iff is countable.

Lemma 4. if preserves card. and is -generic, then iff .ย 

Theorem: if and is then preserves cofinalities and hence preserves cardinals.

Lemma 5. let , is and , et be -generic over and with . Then there is s.t. s.t. for all , then .

It also holds that for each , is countable

Definition: for an infinite cardinal , a set , we name the forcing poset , , .ย 

Properties of this are:ย 

  • in we find partial functions from to of size

  • clearly is a forcing poset

  • it is atomless if

  • it is not absolute for

So for a ctm and a -generic over , is a function with domain and range , then remember the argumetn for .

so , weโ€™ll use where , but , so so . So, in order to prove we now need to show and .

Definition: A poset is -closed iff every sequence of lenght s.t. , has a lower bound, i.e. .

Lemma: If is regular is -closed.

Proof. let be as above, the conditions in the sequence are over all comparable, so is a partial function. By regularity of , has size , thus , also for each by def.

Lemma: suppose is -closed, is a generic, then every cardinal of is a cardinal of , i.e. for , is a cardinalis a cardinal, it preserves only cardinals smaller of a certain .

13th Lecture

Definition: a poset is -closed iff every sequence , of lenght s.t. has a lower bound, i.e. .

Lemma 1. if is regular, is -closed

Lemma 2. suppose is -closed, is -gen. over , let and s.t. , then .

Corollary: suppose is -closed, a -generic over , then every cardinal of (i.e. is a cardinal) is a cardinal of .

Theorem: Let be a ctm of , , and a -generic over , then .

Note: this theorem brings us from a model of () to a model where holds (). The reverse direction, namely from a model of to one of can be done as preaviously shown by .

Proof. let , we know is a surjection form onto (since we are in the poset ). As and , so . By lemma 1. we know that is -closed, so, by cor. . By lemma 2 we know that for every function , s.t. , thus , so . Hence in we have: , hence i.e. .

  1. On , take surj.

  2. Since we have and is surj. and , then .

  3. Lemma 1: is -closed, so, by cor:

  4. Lemma 2: , hence

  5. Then in we have: by above and because .

  6. Also: by 2. and hence, since we are in IDK

  7. Hence .

There is a recap with the bigger picture of the whole procedure on the Notes, there is not much advantage in writing all of this down here again, since some things are just not relevant for the exam and other are clearer on the sheet.

Claim (trivial)

By lemma 1. in Lecture 13 we know that for regular then is -closed, i.e. all decreasing sequences of cardinality less than are bounded. No decreasing sequence in can be longer than , since the longest would start from and start mapping elements in , at most can get mapped, hence we can state:

Lemma 1. All decreasing sequences in are bounded.

Since is a partial order where every chain (decreasing sequence) is bounded, we can apply the Zornโ€™s lemma and find out that:

Lemma 2. .

This element has no reason to be unique though. In order to get some sort of uniqueness we would need the partial order to be โ€œdownward directedโ€, namely, for a forcing poset :

Lemma 3. If every chain in has an lower bound and holds then the least element is unique.

Proof. here

We get this exact kind of structure, by definition, in a filter, in fact:

Lemma 4. If is a filter and all decreasing sequences are bounded, then there is a unique least element.

Recall that the first condition for to be a filter is ,ย 

Lemma 5. Let be a filter in then there exists a unique least element .

Proof. By lemma 1. we see that every sequence in must be lower bounded too, then we apply lemma 4.

This result shows that for every chosen generic , there will be one element only which carries all informations of the generic, this is the case since we know that . Then:

Theorem Let be -gen. then there is a unique s.t. .

"" If , then by there is a s.t. . There is a unique least element by lemma 5., and since we know .

"" If , since by we have .

In conclusion we notice that for two -generics, and and the respective least elements and , we have iff .

Those elements for simply are what we denote with and their prove of both existence and uniqueness are far more trivial if done in the classical sense. My theorem could be a generalisation but it is probably even simpler to just prove it by imagining how a filter looks like instead of going through this harder process.

If we think about , we could notice that all generics can be identified with complete functions and therefore we could simply take any complete function and consider them to be those that generate the since they force the set of all (and only those by ) propositions that are true in .

Check Exam

Hazel Mail

Now regarding the content of the exam. The focus will be on understanding of the concepts in the course and general structure of the arguments. Thus I will mostly be asking only for sketch proofs - you do not need to learn any proofs given in the lectures in detail (I may ask for an easy, short proof to demonstrate understanding of some concepts/definitions, but that is something you should be able to do on the spot).ย ย 

I will ask you to give at least one explicit definition, such as inaccessible cardinal, (in)compatibility, dense set, filter, generic filter, ccc, <\kappa-closed, p forces phiโ€ฆ You do NOT need to know the definition of the forcing* relation (the one defined recurcively), but you should know the role of this definition in the proof of the Truth and Definability lemmas - i.e. that it is definable within M and we can prove that p forces* phi iff p forces phi (you donโ€™t need to know anything about the proof of this equivalence). You should know the statements of the Truth and Definability lemmas, and be able to give an informal description of the Downward-Lรถwenheim-Skolem Theorem, Mostovski-Shepherdson Collapse, and Montague-Levy Reflection (these latter three are a bit technical to state correctly, so I wonโ€™t ask for a precise statement). Importantly, you should know the role of these results in the proof of the independence of CH from the existence of an inaccessible cardinal, as we discussed in the last lecture.ย ย ย 

I will set a few exercises (computation or simple proofs), such as relativising a formula to a set, showing a formula is absolute for transitive sets, showing a set is dense, giving the valuation of a name etc. I will also ask for at least one sketch proof, such as using forcing to produce a model of not-CH from a ctm of CH or vice-versa. You should then give the relevant definitions and main lemmas/theorems (such as on preserving cardinals) and how they fit together.

Question to myself

Definitions

Question 1. Define inaccessible cardinal

  • inacc. from smaller cardinals trough: , , .

  • strongly inacc. if (i) , (ii) is inacc. (iii) .

  • For an inacc. cardinal , .

  • from K: weakly inacc. if is a regular limit cardinal

  • strongly inacc. if , is reg., .

  • if is a successor, then

  • reg. if is a lim. ord and .

  • .

Question 2. Define (in)compatibility

  • Def.

  • if then .

  • Atom, Atomless definitions and examples, [[Advanced Set Theory (Lecture)#5th Lecture#Definitions]]

Question 3. Define a dense set

  • iff .

  • is a dense set in for infinite.

  • goto: filter, gen. filter

Question 4. Define a filter

  • (i) , (ii) .

  • then and agree on .

Question 5. Define a generic filter

  • .

  • Existence Lemma + Proof.

Question 6. Define the property

  • def. antichain, all antichains are countable, examples

  • has .

  • if and has , then preserves cofinalities and hence cardinals

Question 7. Define the -closed property

  • iff all sequence in , are of length s.t. , has a lower bound, i.e. .

  • If is regular is -closed.

Question 8. Define -names

  • is a -name iff is a relation s.t. is a -name .

  • Define and .

Question 9. Define

  • so iff

  • If and then & proof

  • goto: TL

Question 10. Define .

.

For it holds:

  1. is countable and transitive

  2. is minimal (for any set with the above features we have )

General questions

Question 1. What is the role of in DL and TL, give an approximate definition

  • there is a s.t.

  • is ez from def of "".ย 

  • is definable without parameters in .

We need in order to define within the forcing relation, it would otherwise require knowledge of every generic.

Question 2. Give the context of the equivalence , no proof required

We showed:

  • if and then

  • if then there is some s.t. ย 

and hence the equivalence follows

Question 3. State and give context to both TL and DL, what are they for?

  • there is a s.t. , defines truth of forcing from a given .

  • The DL states then that every forcing relation can be defined without parameters in .

Question 4. State and give context to the Downward Lรถwenheim-Skolem Theorem

  • for inf. and inf. then exists s.t. , .

  • Proof in 3 steps

  • we need this theorem to find a s.t. it gives us all are absolute in . This is hence a model of any finite subset of , though some defs are not absolute, like infinity.

Question 5. State and give context to the Mostowski Collapse Theorem

  • an extensional relation is s.t.

  • For , a rel. on ext., exists a unique tran. set and an isom. .

Question 6. State and give context to the Montague Reflection Theorem

  • are absolute for .

  • Tarski Vaught Test:

Question 7. State approximately the procedure from the existence of an inacc. cardinal to CH

Pars

  1. Define , , .

  2. Set , ,

  3. by abs.

  4. is dense

  5. , hence ย 

  6. Then we have

Pars

  1. Define ย 

  2. has

  3. Def. preserves cardinals

  4. Def. preserves cofinalities

  5. cof card

  6. cof

  7. has pres. cof and card

Pars

has , hence , hence , hence .

Question 8. When do we say that we preserve cardinals?

see. 2. ibid

Exercises

Question 1. Show some relativized to some set .

Care about existentials and forall only, the rest is the same

Question 2. Show some absolute for any transitive set

Remember the definition of , if , then it is absolute for transitive sets. Else, for you need to compute and then show that .

Question 3. Show some set to be dense.

Simply that , with think about the extensions of functions

Question 4. Give the valuation to some name

Remember that and .

Question 5. Use forcing to produce a model of from a ctm of and reverse

Let be a ctm of , , and a -generic over , then . This theorem brings us from a model of () to a model where holds (). The reverse direction, namely from a model of to one of can be done as preaviously shown by .